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Introduction 
Over the past two decades substantial developments have taken place with regard 
to corporate insolvency laws and processes. On a supranational level the 
embracement of Corporate Rescue is exemplified by the presentation of the 
European Commission’s Recommendation on a new approach to business failure 
and insolvency in the spring of 2014
3
. The objective of this Recommendation is to 
enable viable companies in financial distress to restructure at the earliest stage 
possible in order to prevent insolvency, and therefore maximise the total value to 
their stakeholders and the economy as a whole. National legislators in various 
member states within the European Union on the other hand have been as well 
(re)designing insolvency systems in order to facilitate rescue and rehabilitation of 
companies in financial distress. 
This shift throughout Europe towards more debtor-friendly insolvency 
procedures is motivated by a desire to aid distressed companies who have some 
justifiable perspective to continue and therefore to avert unnecessary failure of in 
essence ‘sound’ businesses. Successful rescue of companies in financial distress is 
first of all preferred in order to preserve going concern value instead of piece-meal 
liquidation of the estate. In addition the consequences of liquidating a company in 
financial distress instead of reorganizing its business operations are considered less 
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and less desirable. Businesses are considered to be important drivers of growth, 
innovation, novelty, change, knowledge and wealth. Emphasis on rescue and 
rehabilitation of companies in financial distress is therefore deemed warranted. We 
label this trend as “Corporate Rescue Culture”.  
However what kind of economic realities and forces need to be taken into 
account and which preconditions need to be dealt with if rescue and rehabilitation 
of a distressed company is facilitated? Rescuing businesses is embedded in the 
forces of capitalism. Capitalism’s focus is on creation of value. But how is value or 
wealth created? And how do markets and firms fit into this system? In this article 
we try to interpret the forces of capitalism and its impact on the corporate rescue 
culture. Our characterization of the economic forces is undoubtedly eclectic
4
 and 
dialectic.
5
 This is however the essence of capitalism. We shall start with economics 
in general, and look at two extremes, the Neoclassical vision and in particular the 
evolutionary-complexity vision. Following these considerations we further delve 
into the business, its resources and finally the failed business. Then the main 
objections with regard to corporate rescue will be discussed. Our main conclusion 
is that failure is much more structural than assumed. Businesses and competitive 
advantage are in general temporary and changed, failed and dissolved businesses 
are the essence of capitalism, reasons not to interfere and to facilitate business 
rescue. The main dogma of corporate rescue identical with the conventional theory 
of the firm is that a business is a stable, fixed, successful, continued, independent 
and worthwhile entity. However, (bundles of) resources “flow” through the 
economic cosmos; are attracted and repelled by firms, but they cross firm 
boundaries; particularly knowledge. 
 
The essence of economics: how do societies create wealth or value? 
Economics is about the quest for value. What are the drivers, central forces, 
stylized facts and laws of capitalism? What are the consequences for bankruptcy 
proceedings in general and in particular for the trend of Corporate Rescue Culture 
with regard to these forces?  
The economy is represented by the dazzling array of activities such as 
acting, behaving, producing, buying and selling, deciding, investing, contracting, 
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trusting and, last but not least, enterprising. In this web of dazzling and permanent 
economic activity businesses play an important role. They are the movers by 
combining, cooperating and connecting resources. Essentially the economy is a 
self-organized value chain supported by businesses and markets. This is strikingly 
illustrated by a quote from the Global Competiveness Report: “Wealth is actually 
created in an economy at the micro-economic level – in the ability of firms to 
create valuable goods and services using efficient methods. Only firms can create 
wealth, not governments or other societal institutions. The productivity of a 
country is ultimately set by the productivity of its companies.”
6
 According to 
Handy organizations are the linchpins of our world: “(...).  the wealth of our society 
will depend on them; ultimately, they will be the source of our well-being.”
7
 
What exemplifies the Neoclassical vision? And how does this economic 
perspective differ from the complexity approach? The central pillars of the 
Neoclassical view are based upon the assumption that perfect and complete 
markets are in equilibrium. Agents are fully rational and have full access to free 
information. The world is deemed efficient and static because there are no 
frictions. Resources are mobile and can be, or have been, allocated to their best 
use. So the world is at rest. However Neoclassical scholars are aware that this 
composition does not represent the real world. It is however a useful description to 
derive testable hypotheses. In fact economists agree that the economy is very 
complex; is like our cosmos. However science is the search for simplicity. The 
question is how to simplify and whether or not these simplifications leave out 
important structural elements. 
Complexity economists argue that the complexity problem must be placed 
in the center, from the beginning and at the deepest level. Complexity economics is 
dynamic, out-of-equilibrium, not-efficient, path dependent, non-linear and contains 
frictions and externalities. A key component in the complexity vision is that the 
individual creates the world simultaneously as he or she is influenced by that 
world.
8
 Beinhocker argues that complexity economics is a better approximation of 
economic reality surrounding the “new more knowledge based economy”.
9
 In fact 
it is not only a better reflection of the new, but also of the “old” economy.
10
  
During the Industrial Revolution there was a climate of cooperation 
between scientific and practical knowledge. This created a positive feedback 
between propositional and prescriptive knowledge that accelerated the creation of 
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useful knowledge.
11
 Engineers, mechanics, chemists, physicians, cooperated in 
small creative communities – like a small Silicon Valley – that experimented by 
means of trial and error (or tinkering - “bricolage” – how it is described in 
evolutionary theories). So the economy has always been not a division of labor but 
a division of knowledge. The economy is in essence a system of distributed 
knowledge. Knowledge is not a phenomenon of the presumed new economy but 
has been even a central force in the old economy. “In today’s economy, knowledge 
is coming to represent a larger fraction of the products and services we 
consume”.
12
 However Marshall already recognized the importance of knowledge 
by stating that: “Knowledge is our most powerful engine of production; it enables 
us to subdue Nature and force her to satisfy our wants”.
13
 According to De Gregori 
the “Incomparably greatest among human resources is knowledge. It is because it 
is the mother of all other resources” – “resources they are not, they become”.
14
 In 
fact this is the essence of our changing economic ecology.
15
 We know that 
everything can be improved, so there are unlimited options, however it is unknown 
which option works and is useful. 
Does wealth then comes from following improving existing recipes or 
creating entirely new recipes? According to Romer the last mechanism is the most 
important: “All increases in standards of living can be traced to discoveries of 
more valuable arrangements for the things in the earth’s crust and atmosphere. 
Sustained economic growth is accompanied by the countless large and small 
discoveries that are required to create more value from a fixed set of natural 
resources”.
16
 This process of improvements is however as old as the economy 
itself. Knowledge as compared with physical resources is a non-excludable and 
non-rival resource. Once it is revealed, everybody can use it; it is thus non-scarce. 
It can be added and combined with other knowledge and information. So 
knowledge (or software) begets knowledge, more software building blocks leads to 
bullish imaginable software combinations of which the vast majority is useless – 
“the number of business opportunities is fundamentally bullish in the aggregate, 
even if individual companies come and go ... new practice is implemented by 
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letting inflexible firms collapse and die”.
17
 The larger the body of software 
(knowledge), the faster the growth potential.  Our complex and adaptive system 
embodies an enormous potential. Digitalization, specialization, modularization, 
harmonization, globalization and democratization enlarges the efficiency, scale and 
scope and easiness of using this potential. On the other hand the risks are higher, 
and companies’ lifecycles become shorter. The enormous turnover in business 
activity is a (healthy) sign of  a “restless capitalism”.
18
 However: “The survivors 
may appear to be those having adapted themselves to the environment whereas the 
truth may be that the environment has adopted them”.
19
 
According to Beinhocker wealth creation is “the product of a simple, but 
profoundly powerful, three-step formula – differentiate, select and amplify the 
formula of evolution”. Evolution can be viewed as an algorithm or an all-purpose 
formula for innovation. Market’s “capability” is the computational efficiency as a 
distributed processing system. Businesses are  interactors. “An interactor is a 
design that has been rendered from the possible designs and made real. (...). 
Businesses do the living and dying”.
20
 Both businesses and markets are complex 
adaptive systems that co-evolve. Evolution is cleverer than presumed as nobody is 
truly able to find the highest peak on the fitness landscape. Evolution is essentially 
a knowledge process, while innovation is a change of knowledge in the system. 
But what do markets select? According to Beinhocker it is not the 
company itself but the unit of selection is the underlying business module. 
Business modules are bits of the business plan that have provided in the past, or 
could provide in the future a basis for differential selection between businesses in a 
competitive environment.
21
 “Firms, industries and economies are all involved in 
producing and exchanging products. They do this in complex and interconnected 
ways, thus, the firm is only a very proximate unit of analysis. Connected systems 
produce a product and this may be a firm or it may be a firm plus other partner or 
subcontracting firms and a range of consultants and specialists in the service sector 
may be involved. Modern production systems are bewildering networks of 
connections”.
22
 In these mini-ecologies, or self-organized value chains – it is 
connections that count (and not if these connection are inter or intra connections). 
It may be that the factor of analysis – the given independent firm - is the wrong 
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element.
23
 The focus should be on the (whole) value chain, not on the individual 
firm. 
Hanauer and Beinhocker stress that capitalism is not a mere system of 
making markets more efficient, but it is a system of finding new solutions to 
problems. This experimenting economy is not efficient but it is wasteful. 
Capitalism’s great strength is its embracement of creativity which is a hugely 
inefficient and wasteful evolutionary process. Hanauer and Beinhocker call this 
“an emerging twenty-first century view of the economy”
24
. 
Yet one can wonder if this complex adaptive ecological system did not 
already exist in a perhaps more primordial form much earlier. The forces were 
always there, but not as explicit and visible as they are now due to the acceleration 
of the pace of just about everything.
25
 “The economy like the biosphere, is about 
persistent creativity in ways of making a living”
26
. The economy as a complex 
adaptive system was already recognized by Adam Smith – he is a “man of system”, 
or a “complexity theorist with a Sante Fe Vision”.
27
 Emergence, serendipity, luck 
and coincidence were and still are important drivers for, increasing returns, 
nonlinearity and positive feedback and the rise, existence and fall of the firm. 
The chances that knowledge will eventually be undermined by future 
developments are very high. Romer labels this with the term “combinatorial 
explosion of ideas”– an analogy of Cambrian explosion. “Converging technologies 
are causing industries to shift and blur, changing the very nature of products. The 
distinct identities of products, services, channels, industries and companies are 
rapidly changing”.
28
 Schumpeter already wrote about this tendency in the 1930’s. 
“Capitalism, is by nature a form or method of economic change. (…). The 
fundamental impulse that sets and keeps the capitalist engine in motion comes 
from the new consumer’s goods, the new methods of production or transportation, 
the new markets, the new forms of industrial organization that capitalist enterprise 
creates. “… the problem that is usually … visualized is how capitalism administers 
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existing structures whereas the relevant problem is how it creates and destroys 
them. This kind of competition disciplines before it attacks”
29
. 
A business is (usually considered to be) a successful and a value creating, 
capturing and sustaining organization within a value chain. The fluid and 
subjective nature of value is the essence of business. The essence of generating 
value is that it is by nature uncertain and cannot be foreseen nor taken for granted. 
Businesses are constructions to test value-creating propositions. The outcomes of 
this process are (a few) winners and (many) losers. The essential purpose of 
organizational law is to facilitate collective action. “Organizational law empowers 
firms to hold assets and enter contracts as entities that are legally distinct from their 
owners and managers. This is a kind of asset partitioning or asset or entity 
shielding”.
30
 Legal structures that enable evolutionary processes are important to 
the success and survival of any social structure. “Freedom to experiment is 
important in fostering this process. The point of evolutionary theory is that no one 
can determine a priori what is the best model, even for most firms, most of the 
time”.
31
 Organizational law facilitates therefore the bundling of resources to 
experiment with the encompassing purpose of creating value. Creating value is the 
essence of economics; the self-organized value chains move, transform and 
reposition resources in order to create wealth (“a fit order”). Organizational law is 
only a facilitator in the quest for value, by shielding successful firms, but not 
unconditionally. The condition is that the combination creates value. This created 
value is essential to compensate stakeholders for their contributions. 
 
The firm as a changing, moving and failing entity in the value chain 
Specialization is not enough to let firms arise and succeed. In this situation all 
people could be an entrepreneur. Coordination could occur via the market or via a 
firm. Smith is rather vague about the ‘organizational consequences’ of 
specialization.
32
 Smith’s most famous business example is the pin factory; it is an 
example of how specialization and cooperation increase productivity. However: 
“There is more of a mystery to the origin of the pin factory. It makes little sense, 
and it helps our understanding not at all, to assign a high a priori fitness to the pin 
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factory. That fitness must emerge from the context.”
33
 What are the underlying 
forces of the origin, existence and failure of firms? The theory of the firm is 
remarkably focussed on the existence of the firm, and silent about its origin and in 
particular its failure. No universal and single theory does justice to firm (and 
market) development and movement: “… the trends and developments related to it 
are one more example of how mind-bendingly and marvelously complex the world 
of capitalism can be, with not only constant churn in terms of entry and exit but 
also combinations, divestitures, cosmetic alterations (name changes), strategic 
shifts, break-ups, acquisitions, and so on. This reality goes far deeper than what we 
can glean from aggregate numbers, and in their work, economists do not always 
convey this complexity. Those in the midst of it—managers, executives, 
employees, consultants—either do not seek the big picture or are prone to 
breathless extrapolations of small samples into the latest trends. But, “this 
messiness is where prosperity is made”.
34
 
According to Coase
35
 there are costs involved with using the price 
system: transaction costs. The firm is an institution that can economize on those 
costs. It is an alternative mechanism to the market with which the economy is 
naturally endowed. The market coordinates with the price signal, the firm with 
“her” hierarchy. After Coase other strands have been developed: the transaction 
and agency approaches, the resource based and knowledge based theories. 
However changes and the entrepreneurial, modular - linked in the value chain - and 
to some extend the cognitive function of the firm do not show up in these theories 
of the firm, besides the rise and fall. The market and the firm already exist – are 
given, the approaches focus on the (static) existence of the firm and the market, not 
on their genesis, and failure. However a lot of companies have failed or changed 
their activities, products, technologies, subsidiaries or organisation due to 
coincidental circumstances, the firm is an emergent (temporary) entity. This 
“picture” corresponds more with the firm in daily speech of the strategists and 
marketeers. 
Pitelis and Teece
36
 identify the nature, essence and objectives of a firm. 
They conclude that reconfiguration and market creation do not show up in the 
theory of the firm. The essence of the firm is in the diagnosis, configuration and 
leveraging of knowledge assets and organizational capabilities to allow the 
principals of these organizations to effectuate the capturing of value (profit) from 
both the creative and routine operations of the business. Accordingly, the 
diagnosis, upgrading, and integration (and disaggregating,) of intra-firm resources 
(as complementary to inter-firm resources) and organizational capabilities, 
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especially dynamic capabilities, so as to achieve firm-level sustainable competitive 
advantage, can be regarded as “the essence of the firm”. Taylor concludes that the 
present (theoretical) conceptualization and stylization of the firm are not suitable 
for analyzing the process of enterprising and entrepreneuring that run through 
capitalist societies. The firm is invoked uncritically as the smallest unit of analysis 
– as a phenotype, a formative element in the economic-cum-social system. It is a 
“given”. It is necessary to get beneath the stylized fact of the firm as a legal entity 
(behind the legal landscape that has preoccupied economic theory). The firm is 
seen as key driver of change, innovation and knowledge transfer, but in the 
conceptualization the firm is effectively relegated to being a driver that does not 
drive but only is driven. The firm as a legal unit (a stylized shell) is given. This 
tends to obscure and deflect attention away from more organic, social processes of 
people being enterprising. Processes of enterprise are broader than the terrain of 
legally defined ‘firms’ and business enterprises that only weakly reflects them. 
“Business enterprises are (…) temporary expressions of the processes of enterprise: 
legal and operational entities that are temporary coalitions of networked venturers 
and entrepreneurial endeavour that are crystallised and dissolved as conditions 
(economic, social and regulatory) change and are modified” (...). “Corporations too 
are temporary coalitions of strategic decision-makers who assemble and 
disassemble structures of subsidiaries, associates, strategic alliances and joint 
ventures for the purposes of wealth creation.” (...). “The firm is temporary in the 
sense that business opportunities are time and place specific. Firm’s linkages and 
markets wax and wane.”
37
 
So the function, essence, objectives and raison d’être of a firm are 
embodied in the social processes (the inter and intra linkages of resources in the 
value chains) of finding new better solutions for problems. This changing context 
is time and place specific. Failure nonetheless does not show up in the theory of the 
firm, nor do movements with respect to (un)bundled assets, disinvestments, 
acquisitions, mergers, and the principle that markets always win and why most 
firms fail! This requires a deeper understanding of the underlying forces shaping 
the competitive landscape, namely the complexity of the self-organized value 
chains. 
 
(Bundles of) Resources or business modules cross firm boundaries 
Intangible resources are the underlying factors of the competitive advantage of a 
business and they are crucial for a successful, continuing business with superior 
performance. Dierickx and Cool
38
 argue that the critical strategic resources are 
non-tradable as they can only be built and accumulated within a business. Strategic 
assets are nontradeable, nonimitable and nonsubstitutable; these assets are shielded 
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from the market. Diericks and Cool point out that the idiosyncratic nature of firm 
specific assets precludes their tradeablity on open markets. 
The “triumph of bits” and the “age of modularity”
39
 opens numerous 
opportunities and even more threats. Due to this trend knowledge can easily be 
copied, communicated, connected and coordinated. “When information (the ore) is 
carried by things – it goes where the things go and no further. But once everyone is 
connected electronically, information can travel by itself.”
40
 Due to the “explosion 
of connectivity” (the universal application of bits) value chains can easily be 
subdivided into business modules. This opens opportunities to transform, 
reconfigure and even transplant or supersede (parts of) the value chain. “The links 
within the firm may be much weaker than in the past, and conversely links between 
firms, tied together for instance of complementary technologies, may be stronger 
(…). the economic organization may have boundaries that are very different from 
the legal entity known as the firm”
41
. The value chain pushes and pulls at the 
(critical) alienable resources of the firm. Knowledge is less bound to a business as 
it can be used elsewhere when there are better valuable opportunities.
42
 In case of 
failed firms valuable knowledge can easily flow to other useful opportunities. Why 
should the use of resources be constrained by the walls of the failed firms? In fact 
bundles of resources cross the boundaries of firms frequently, as it did in the past. 
“An economy is a coordinated system of distributed knowledge (...). in 
economic evolution markets are actually information-processing-knowledge-
structuring mechanisms.”
43
 Value chains can self-organise. Useful knowledge will 
in general be absorbed by other links in the value chain. These knowledge 
diffusion and spill-overs are the essence of capitalism. Knowledge is a complex 
and slippery concept as it emerges through interactions and slips away through 
these same interactions. Knowledge is in a permanent state of flux and 
perishable.”
44
 Knowledge is a non-rival and non-excludable resource which 
everybody can use. Knowledge flows even harder, via trivial, subtle and implicit 
mechanisms compared with tangible resources. 
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The firm: a changing and/or failing organization 
The knowledge based firm is therefore a time and place dependent organization of 
resources embedded in the social organization of value chains surrounded by a 
membrane of trust, incentives or a dedicated hierarchy. In fact the firm is like a 
sub-economy with strong links and forces (that push and pulls to the firm’s 
resources) within the value chain. In theories of the firm, business science and the 
legal conception of the firm however, the firm is a given. This assumes that every 
business is a worthwhile organization which continues to prosper and grow and 
shows persistent above-normal performance. It is of course impossible that all 
businesses persistently grow and show above average performance. There is lots of 
empirical evidence and theoretical insights that the existence of successful firms 
and the life time of firms is not perpetual. Failure is the norm, long-lasting success 
is exceptional. A firm is not only dismantled in case of failure, this bundling and 
unbundling is the essence of enterprising. To change the boundaries of a firm is not 
exceptional but a normal fact of business life. Both are essential symptoms of 
capitalism. 
Ormerod notices that business failure does not show up in the theory of 
the firm. Yet the brutal truth is that most firms fail. The world of business is just 
too complex and it is therefore illusory to think that we can predict the 
successfulness of a business, idea, innovation or an investment. Ormerod 
characterizes business decision making as playing a game of chess were you do not 
know your opponent, the rules change and you do not know when you have won.
45
 
The world of business is full of mistakes but not all mistakes are lethal. However: 
ultimately markets win, because there are numerous and unlimited potential 
competitors who can buy, copy, imitate, substitute, steal, reveal and undermine the 
critical resources of an organization. Wiggins and Ruefli conclude that sustainable 
competitive advantage and superior performance is very rare; firms with long 
enduring competitive advantage are statistical outliers.
46
 Stubbart and Knight focus 
on disappearing firms. They point at the core assumption that survival is the vital 
objective for a firm; it is the ‘correct outcome’. Their conclusion from scrutinizing 
more than 240 documents is that the vast majority of firms, even large firms, 
survive relatively short periods. These findings are consistent with the vision of an 
environment full of uncertainties, surprising spurts of growth and dramatic 
reversals – an environment where long term survival is problematic.” (…). “Long 
term survival might be better regarded as a purely random result of complex 
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interactions among competing organizations”.
47
 Failure of the firm also happened 
frequently in the past
48
. 
Businesses exist because they create limitations: they reduce the 
environment and focus on a limited number of products, processes or business 
activities. Yet the potential threats are unlimited. Success comes from limitations 
in different disguises but failure comes however from unlimited possibilities. 
Focus and specialization are reasons of existence in specific, but failure in general. 
Failure is far more pervasive than existence and survival. There are simply a lot of 
(unknown) unknowns. The only way of selecting firms is through testing by 
Smith’s ‘invisible hand’. The market extracts (in a biased but objective way) poor 
performing, wealth destroying firms out of a total business population. 
 
Failed firms: should they be rescued? 
Markets separate underperforming from well performing firms through an 
objective and neutral criterion (which can of course be biased): a firm that does not 
pay its debt. This criterion creates an objective equal level playing field on the 
capitalist landscape. It could be that insolvency proceedings have two pitfalls: the 
low debt coverage ratio and the low percentage of the failed firms that continue 
their business. From the perspective that the business is still viable and able to 
create and capture value, (static) efficiency is the encompassing norm, failure 
comes suddenly, reorganization is quick and easy, failure is a mere financial 
problem and the resources are less (or not) valuable in another alternative 
allocation, this statement could be right
49
. But these requirements are very, very 
strict. Is this “wrongful determination failure selection bias” (the insolvency 
criterion) so strong that it destroys much going concern value on average? In fact 
none of these requirements shows up on average. A market’s primary function, 
based upon the complexity perspective, is to differentiate between valuable and 
non-valuable businesses. The reason why markets are so good at this is their 
computational efficiency as distributed processing systems: “Markets are almost 
pure evolutionary systems; evolution is cleverer than you are. Markets superiority 
in command and control is attributable not to their efficiency at resource allocation 
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in equilibrium, but because of their effectiveness at innovation in 
disequilibrium.”
50
  
Can a failed firm then easily be transformed into a value creating entity? 
Based upon the assumption that static (efficiency allocative) markets selects poorly 
functioning firms in static industries then the selection is a signal to restructure the 
business. But this is the same as assuming that in principle businesses are always 
viable (because they have existed for a while). In essence every firm can be saved, 
but is it rational to do so? Markets select firms that cannot create and capture value 
or cannot transform it into cash. Only if the last part of this value-cycle is 
problematic restoring the business has a function. Entrepreneurs have a tendency to 
be too optimistic and keeping faith in the previously chosen direction (that used to 
be successful). Usually the symptoms of a downturn show up at an earlier instance. 
Yet entrepreneurs or company directors wait too long to reconfigure their 
businesses.
51
 Management usually want to turn the tide themselves, keep control 
over important decisions, believe in their success, want to retain trust, faith and 
reputation and are ignorant because of the required focus. Failure does not 
suddenly arise out of nowhere. Usually there has been a long(er) period of 
downward spiral consisting of a process of value destruction. “Bankruptcy is not 
the cause of the decline in value of the firm. It is the result.”
52
  
Attempting to make failed firms become more efficient, assuming a static 
context, is not much of help. “There is nothing so useless as doing efficiently that 
which should not be done at all”.
53
 In a distressed financial situation the main 
focus, due to time pressure, is in general on the financial and not the much needed 
strategic restructuring. This leaves the essence of business failure intact and can be 
perhaps best described as merely rearranging the chairs on the deck of the Titanic. 
However a firm has less strict boundaries and ties than is recognized. The firm is a 
temporary coalition that attracts and repels resources. It is not necessary that 
(growth) opportunities should be executed under the current membrane of the 
corporate veil. The static, efficient and strict boundaries view on the legal and 
economic theory of the firm and business sciences do not correspond to the 
complex economic forces of capitalism. These theories do not correspond to the 
empirical and theoretical facts of firm turnover, mergers, failure, emergence, 
serendipity, luck, mistakes, divestures, alliances, that more resembles a(n evolving) 
complex economic ecology. Failure (and change) is endemic and structural, 
success is incidental. 
The low debt recovery rate and the going concern rate of insolvent firms is 
simply the result of the fact that there is no value potential. Creditor friendly 
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insolvency proceedings are therefore not old fashioned but can be considered very 
modern. The focus should not be on sustaining failing firms, but on experimenting 
and rearranging the value chain in the most effective manner with consequences 
that cannot be foreseen. The essence of capitalism and economics is in the self-
organized value chains, in which resources flow and value cannot be foreseen. The 
mere bundling through a business is temporary. In a complex environment only the 
market can assess value and whether or not the company may proceed. 
 
Three problems of the corporate rescue culture 
Failure and changing boundaries of the firm is the essence of economies and 
enterprising in capitalism. Legal as well as most economic theories of the firm are 
focussed on strict boundaries; corporate rescue is focussed on maintaining these 
boundaries. The changing links between the inter and intra value chains is the 
unknown outcome of a self-organized complex system. Sometimes resources can 
do better if they are freed from the yoke of the corporate veil. Failed firms are 
viewed as negative on the individual level, for the economy in general it is 
positive.
54
 “Failed entrepreneurs may be as heroic as successful entrepreneurs”.
55
 
“Death hurts, but it isn’t fatal”.
56
 
A firm binds different kind of assets; it could be argued that nowadays the 
assets contain less tangible, and more intangible assets that cannot be sold easily. 
The difference between the going concern and liquidation value in the (more) 
knowledge-based economy is even higher. The probable loss of value is even 
bigger than it was in the past. Knowledge is a non-rival and non-excludable good, 
everybody can use it. Knowledge and information flow due to behavior, strategies, 
feedback and performance, learning, investing, buying, selling etc. - it is in a 
permanent state of flux. The essence is that useful knowledge, just like other 
resources, does not stay within the boundaries of the company, but it flows out and 
in, is used, created, transformed, copied, imitated, captured, sold and it perishes. 
By capturing the value (by using it) others notice it, and can use it themselves. 
Capturing the value of knowledge undermines its value. These flows are more 
intense and faster, but also more implicit, trivial,
57
 subtle, unnoticed and 
unconscious than other tangible resources which are more explicitly exchanged. 
Knowledge flows is what economics is about, not only now, but also in the past. 
Knowledge flows in and out of organizations - especially out of  failed firms. We 
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doubt that knowledge of failed firms is highly valuable, that firms own it, that this 
value is easily captured in firms and that the value cannot be captured elsewhere. 
Because in essence knowledge already flows; useful knowledge is already 
absorbed by the market. Market evolutionary algorithm is capable of moving 
knowledge efficiently through the value chains.  
Finally we summarize three main (overlapping) objections to business 
rescue culture: 
 
1. Rescue comes too late 
Enterprising is committing to an investment plan that is (partly) irreversible: 
“Truly strategic choices are difficult or costly to reverse once made”
58
. Failure 
does not appear without reason. There are usually concrete signs of distress at the 
earliest stages of the downward spiral which go unnoticed and are neglected. 
However entrepreneuring is also about neglecting certain assumptions and creating 
new limitations. Recovery plans are usually developed and implemented at a very 
late stage when the competitive disadvantage cannot be turned. It is 
comprehensible that management does not want to start to early with disclosing 
and announcing that the firm has entered a downward spiral. This can accelerate 
this spiral due to stakeholders becoming more demanding and hesitant about 
supplying the business with their services on less attractive conditions. The holders 
of the critical (and valuable) resources can withdraw their support. Management 
furthermore may lose its independency in determining the policy of the firm. 
Empirical research reveals that management ignores early warning signals
59
. This 
neglect of signals is called myopic behaviour, but in a successful context it is 
characterized as keeping focus). What’s the alternative, at what moment can and do 
we facilitate business rescue? The timing is extremely difficult and cannot be 
formulated in an objective way. 
 
2. Rescue is too subjective 
Default on debt is an objective norm to select value-destroying firms. (Legal) 
insolvency has to be replaced by another norm to start and proceed the 
restructuring. Which norm must be applied and furthermore at which moment? 
Does it provide wrong incentives: continuing a poor performing firm?
60
, free 
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riding on others and without worrying about the consequences of insolvency? Does 
it distort competition because facilitating rescue is just like subsidizing poor 
performance? This interferes with the co-evolution of markets and firms, which 
selects valuable resources and allocates them in the self-organized value chains. 
 
3. Rescue is too complex 
How can the viability of a company in distress be assessed? The viability can only 
be tested by markets. Furthermore who is to decide and who is able  to recognize 
value? The insolvency practitioner has to be a true “magician” to pinpoint viability. 
The following rhetorical question can be asked: If they are so smart (at identifying 
viable firms), why are they still here? If they are so smart, why are they doing this 
job and why aren’t they rich? Is the insolvency practitioner well equipped to 
perform this task? Is he negligent when mistakes are made? How does he balance 
the conflicting purposes of maximization of value with employment (retaining 
jobs) and other social purposes?  
Stangler and Arbesman paraphrase the economic business environment as 
“messiness where prosperity is made”. In this messiness were value is created, 
value chains are formed and transformed. The firm is a link in the value chain, the 
value it creates can only be known ex post (and in that case only partly and for a 
certain period). The viability of “this project” can and should not be assumed, it 
can only be tested via markets. The essence of value creation is that it cannot be 
predicted, if this is possible it cannot be created anymore! Evolution is more clever 
than us human beings. Are insolvency practitioners more clever than markets and 
evolution in recognizing sources of value? 
 
Conclusion 
A company has to specialize and to focus on something, it has to create its own 
limitations in order to be distinctive. A company cannot take into account 
everything: it would be impossible to be effective and efficient. It would paralyze 
the firm. Progress is obtained by trial and error, but this means most firms 
ultimately fail. This is the basic competitive force. Markets select poor performing 
(wealth destroying) firms. But this has positive consequences for the aggregate 
macro perspective; this is what Metcalfe calls “a restless capitalism”. Why should 
we interfere in this selection process in an environment where resources flow in the 
quest for value in the value chains? The task of the insolvency practitioner in a 
business rescue perspective is very complex and subjective in particular with 
regard to the assessment of the viability in light of the feasibility and desirability of 
rescuing failed businesses. With embracing the business rescue culture the neutral, 
objective equal level playing field of a business dissolution with a clear purpose 
has been replaced by a subjective and complex minefield with a mixed purpose. 
Does this create additional conflicts and bankruptcy costs? Interferences with the 
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market have to be justified, we see no clear advantage of business rescue 
interference, only a lot of disadvantages. 
 
“The overuse of the survivor technique, distorting our understanding of 
the process that has led to the present state of things, has affected several 
disciplines besides business history. If we merely observe that many of the 
firms that now dominate the economy are of ancient lineage, or that some 
of today’s top firms were also at the top a century earlier, we might 
conclude that giant firms are generally long-lasting; yet the stated 
observation is equally compatible with the hypothesis that some initially 
small firms grow rapidly to become large, while corporate giants have, 
over reasonably long periods, a poor survival rate. Our current knowledge 
of survivors dominates our impression of the typical experience, and their 
triumphs are lionized, while the history of the failures is forgotten or 
considered untypical”.
61
 
 
The companies that prevail and exist now have defeated a lot of other firms, have 
absorbed the remains of failed companies, have assembled and disassembled their 
resources. The dynamics of creation, adaptation, failure and dissolution of firms 
represent the forces of capitalism. We have to look behind the stylised legal shell 
and economic theory of the firm. Firms are movers and often choose the wrong 
policy and opportunity; “most things fail”. However failed firms are essential for 
capitalism. The focus should be on experimentation, not in preventing failed firms 
from collapsing. Progress is obtained not despite of failure, but due to failure! A 
more positive appraisal of failure is needed: “The firm is dead: Hurrah for the 
failed firm”. 
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